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Commercial Property and Financial Stability 
– An International Perspective
Luci Ellis and Chris Naughtin*
Commercial property and property development have historically posed a greater direct risk 
to financial institutions’ balance sheets than have housing and mortgage markets. A number 
of factors contribute to this: banks’ commercial property lending is concentrated in loans 
for construction and development, which tend to be risky; imbalances can build up further 
because construction lags are longer; and incentives to avoid default are weaker for borrowers 
in the commercial property sector than they are for home loan borrowers. Conditions in global 
commercial property markets have been especially challenging in the current cycle.
*  The authors are from Financial Stability Department.
Introduction
In the United States, but also to some extent in 
other countries, housing and mortgage markets 
have played an important role in the most recent 
crisis. International experience suggests, however, 
that exposures to commercial property markets 
have usually posed greater direct risk to the balance 
sheets of financial institutions. Bank exposures 
to commercial real estate (CRE), along with other 
corporate lending, have historically been one of 
the main sources of loan losses during episodes of 
banking sector difficulties. This was true both for 
industrialised economies – for example the banking 
crises in Scandinavia and Japan in the early 1990s, 
as well as the US savings & loan crisis – and for the 
emerging markets most affected by the 1997–1998 
Asian financial crisis. Conditions in global commercial 
property markets have been especially challenging 
in the current cycle. In most countries, with the 
notable exception of the United States, losses on 
CRE lending (including on loans to developers of 
residential property) currently account for a much 
greater share of actual and prospective loan losses 
than do residential mortgages to households.  
This article briefly discusses recent developments 
in commercial property markets in a number of 
industrialised economies. It also draws out some of 
the characteristics of CRE and aspects of the way it 
is financed, which contribute to its greater cyclicality 
and capacity to threaten financial stability compared 
with residential mortgage lending. 
Developments in Major 
Commercial Property Markets
In most countries, the price cycle in CRE markets 
has been more severe during the recent economic 
downturn than that in housing. Except for France, 
the recent decline in commercial property prices 
has been much greater than for residential property, 
even though the run-up in commercial property 
prices in some cases was much less marked   
(Table 1 and Graph 1). The difference in the sizes   
of commercial and residential property price cycles 
has been particularly stark in the United States, 
the United Kingdom and Ireland where, on some 
measures, CRE prices have fallen by between 20 and 
30 percentage points more than residential property 
prices from the peak to the trough. 26 ReseRve BAnk of AustRAliA
CommeRCiAl pRopeRty And finAnCiAl stABility – An inteRnAtionAl peRspeCtive















Sources: APM; Bloomberg; Jones Lang LaSalle; Thomson Reuters
Commercial real estateR esidential real estate








The downturn in the commercial property market 
has coincided with a contraction in credit flows to   
the sector; most lenders in the United States and   
United Kingdom have reported that lending   
standards have tightened over the past couple of 
years (Graph  2). Reported demand for CRE loans 
remains subdued in the United States, although 
there are tentative signs of stronger demand in 
the United Kingdom. Funding from capital markets 
has become more difficult and global issuance of 
commercial mortgage-backed securities is well 
below the levels of a couple of years ago.
Characteristics of Commercial  
Real Estate 
Although housing construction contributes 
significantly to cyclicality in total economic 
output, activity in the commercial property and 
development sector has usually contributed more 
to the build-up of financial vulnerabilities in previous 
cycles. Fluctuations in CRE activity and prices 
propagate rapidly through financial institutions’ 














Commercial Property Credit Standards*
Net percentage reporting tightening standards
*U S asks whether lending standards have changed in the quarter. UK asks
whether the supply of credit has changed. UK survey applies twice the
weight to a ‘considerably’ answer relative to a ‘somewhat’ answer. US
applies an equal weight.
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Table 1: Cumulated Changes in Property Prices
Peak to trough, per cent(a)





United Kingdom –44.2 –22.5
United States(c) –43.7 –13.5
(a) Trough in price level or latest available data where prices are still falling.
(b) Commercial property price measure comprises prime office space only.
(c) FHFA measure for detached houses only; cycle in S&P measure is substantially greater.
Sources: APM; Bloomberg; Jones Lang LaSalle; Thomson Reuters27 Bulletin | june Quarter 2010
CommeRCiAl pRopeRty And finAnCiAl stABility – An inteRnAtionAl peRspeCtive
  • the CRE loan book is more exposed to the 
construction cycle than is the housing loan book;
  • imbalances can build up further because of 
construction lags; 
  • borrowers in the CRE sector do not have as much 
of a disincentive to default as home mortgage 
borrowers; and
  • the typical features of CRE financing induce 
greater correlations in defaults on these loans.
The share of (relatively risky) construction and 
development loans in the banking sector’s CRE 
portfolio is greater than for mortgage lending. CRE 
lending is generally taken to include construction 
and development (C&D) loans to corporates, 
as well as loans for buy-and-hold investment in 
non-residential property (e.g. real estate investment 
trusts). Owners of existing CRE, unlike household 
owners of residential property, are often able to 
access capital market funding, thereby reducing 
their call on bank-originated funding. In addition, 
some C&D projects for new residential property 
(housing construction) are undertaken by firms and 
are treated as CRE exposures. Both these market 
features cause banks’ CRE exposures to be relatively 
more concentrated in financing new development 
than in financing buy-and-hold investors, compared 
with the mix of construction versus purchase loans in 
the housing mortgage book. Among US institutions 
insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC), for example, C&D accounts for around 20 per 
cent of CRE loans, compared with 3  per cent for 
residential real estate. This mix matters because 
C&D loans are inherently more prone to becoming 
impaired in a downturn than (secured) loans for 
buy-and-hold investment. The value of the project 
is not realised until it is complete, and as discussed 
below, this can result in sizeable losses-given-default 
on the associated loans. Property developers also 
sometimes have undiversified business models, so 
they are more likely to fail in economic downturns. 
Given that much CRE lending is for specific projects, 
and that loans are frequently syndicated, it is often an 
easier market for new entrants (including foreign and 
second-tier domestic banks) than retail mortgage 
lending and relationship-based commercial lending. 
And within the CRE lending market, the entering 
lenders are more likely to end up with the more 
marginal, less-established borrowers. This dynamic 
adds to the concentration of risk around CRE lending. 
The United States is a good example of the 
consequences of these factors for the financial 
system. Small US deposit-taking institutions (those 
with assets less than US$10  billion) are relatively 
highly exposed to the commercial property sector. 
At small deposit-taking institutions, commercial 
property lending accounts for 40  per cent of   
their on-balance sheet gross loans, compared with 
21  per cent for mid-sized banks and 13  per cent 
for large banks (Graph 3). Within this, the smaller 
institutions are also more exposed to loans for 
C&D, providing almost half of C&D loans in the   
United States. Similarly in Australia, much of 
the increase in exposures and non-performing 
commercial property loans has been seen among 












US Banks’ Commercial Real Estate Loans*
Per cent of gross loans, as at March 2010
*F DIC-insured institutions
** C&D excluding 1–4 family residential construction
Source: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
%
B Small (assets <US$10b) B Large (assets >US$100b)
B Medium (assets US$10b–US$100b) B All banks
%
Multifamily CRE holdings C&D** Total28 ReseRve BAnk of AustRAliA
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Construction lags are longer and construction 
cycles are lumpier for commercial developments 
than for housing construction.  Dwellings – 
particularly detached single-family houses – can be 
erected more quickly than a typical commercial 
development such as a shopping centre, office 
building or apartment building. Average construction 
lags are therefore inherently longer in the 
commercial property sector than for residential 
property. As a result it is easier for ‘hog cycles’ to 
arise, where building work in the pipeline turns out 
to have been unnecessary because demand has 
already turned down. If the market turns down 
before the project is finished, the result can be an 
unfinished site with little residual recovery value 
other than the land. Depending on the remediation 
or completion costs, the loss to the bank can be 
100 per cent of the loan or even more. 
Commercial property can be more cyclical than 
residential real estate because its construction is 
lumpier. Commercial property developments are 
larger relative to the size of the existing stock of CRE 
than is the case for housing. New (CRE) developments 
therefore have a greater local supply effect than for 
residential property. Vacancy rates tend to remain 
high long after the economic downturn and well 
into the subsequent recovery, because it takes a   
considerable period of time for excess supply 
to be absorbed. For example, in the recession of   
2000–2001, US office vacancy rates increased 
steadily from 7.7 per cent in the September quarter 
2000 to a peak of 16.8 per cent three years later, and 
remained above 16 per cent until late 2004, long 
after the turnaround in GDP growth. 
In the current cycle, the National Association of 
Realtors expects US office vacancy rates to peak at 
17.4 per cent in 2011, around two years after the 
trough in GDP growth (Table 2). Industrial and retail 
vacancy rates are forecast to increase to around 
14½ per cent and 13 per cent respectively this year 
and remain roughly steady in 2011. In contrast, the 
average vacancy rate on multifamily residential real 
estate is believed to have already peaked in 2009 
and is expected to decline to around 6  per cent 
by 2011. 
Table 2: Commercial Property Vacancy Rates(a) 
Per cent
2008 2009 2010(b) 2011(b)
Australia 4.2 7.8 8.7 8.7
France 4.0 6.7 10.7 10.7
Germany 9.5 11.9 13.8 14.2
Spain 6.7 10.6 12.6 12.8
United Kingdom 10.1 13.4 13.2 10.1
United States
– Office 13.4 15.7 17.3 17.4
– Industrial 10.4 13.2 14.6 14.5
– Retail  9.7 12.0 12.7 12.7
– Multifamily 5.7 7.4 7.0 6.1
(a)   For office property unless otherwise stated. Simple average of major commercial property markets in each country except  
for Australia and the United States. France covers Paris CBD and Paris La Defense; Germany covers Berlin, Frankfurt, Munich  
and Hamburg; Spain covers Madrid and Barcelona; United Kingdom covers London City and London West End.
(b) Private sector forecasts.
Sources: National Association of Realtors; Property Council of Australia members; RREEF Research29 Bulletin | june Quarter 2010
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Similar trends in vacancy rates are evident in the   
euro area, especially for Germany. Private sector 
bodies forecast office vacancy rates in major 
German cities to peak in 2011, two years after 
the trough in German GDP. For the other major   
euro area economies, they expect vacancy rates 
to peak in either 2010 or 2011, consistent with the 
relative speeds of economic recovery, but later 
than the recoveries in GDP.  In the United Kingdom,   
office vacancy rates in London are forecast to decline 
more rapidly than in other major markets but are 
expected to remain above 10 per cent in 2011.  
Default probabilities are arguably more cyclically 
sensitive for CRE loans than for residential 
mortgages.  Defaults on CRE lending tend to be 
bunched in cyclical downswings, more so than 
defaults on residential mortgages. The main reason 
for this is the cyclicality of defaults on lending 
for construction projects described above. In 
addition, defaults by buy-and-hold investors are 
also highly cyclical, because they are usually not 
owner-occupiers. They therefore face the risk of a 
sudden loss of rental income should the tenant move 
out, which is more likely in an economic downturn, 
when more firms are failing or otherwise shedding 
labour. If the value of the property has also fallen 
below the size of the loan, these borrowers might 
make themselves better off by defaulting. Owners 
of CRE are thus typically more likely to default in a 
downturn than home-owning households, who 
derive the same real benefit from living in their 
home regardless of its price. Only a small minority 
of home mortgage borrowers in negative equity 
actually default, even in the United States where 
lenders frequently do not pursue defaulters for any 
deficiency between the collateral value and the loan 
amount (despite the law allowing them to do so in 
most jurisdictions).1
1   Recent Federal Reserve research indicates that only about 1 in 
10 US mortgage borrowers in negative equity actually default 
(Foote, Gerardi and Willen 2008). In the United Kingdom and other 
industrialised economies, industry reports suggest that this fraction is 
even smaller.
The importance of C&D lending in making the CRE 
loan book riskier than home loans can be seen 
from the poor performance of C&D loans made by   
US deposit-taking institutions. Non-performing   
C&D (predominantly commercial property) loans 
were 17  per cent of gross C&D loans while net 
charge-offs were 6  per cent of gross loans in 
the March quarter  2010 (Graph 4). The level of 
non-performing loans for CRE excluding C&D 
and on residential mortgages was much lower, 
even though these have risen sharply as a share 
of gross loans during the crisis. The quality of 
the collateral securing the loan is crucial to the 
recovery on the loan following a default, and for   
C&D loans, the riskier nature of the collateral also 
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The CRE financing model is more procyclical 
than mortgage lending and more liable to 
produce correlated defaults. In most industrialised 
economies, residential mortgage lending generally 
takes the form of long-term amortising mortgages, 
as is appropriate to the typical expected holding 
periods for the asset. By contrast, much of the 
banking sector’s lending to CRE is in the form of 
shorter-term project and syndicated finance, even 
for existing properties, which do not have the 
short-term horizon of a construction project. 30 ReseRve BAnk of AustRAliA
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CRE borrowers therefore face more refinancing 
risk than mortgage borrowers in most countries; 
when that risk does crystallise, it is generally 
correlated across borrowers as the credit cycle 
turns. During the recent housing boom in the 
United States, the residential mortgage market 
became more similar to CRE finance, shifting 
towards products that all but required frequent 
refinancing, to avoid the sharp payment increases 
built into the contract (Gorton 2008). It is not a 
coincidence that mortgage defaults became more 
cyclical and more correlated following that shift – 
that is, more like the historical pattern of defaults on 
CRE loans. 
Several other aspects of CRE finance contribute to 
its procyclicality. Unlike home mortgage lending, 
banks often impose covenants on CRE firms’ gearing 
over the life of the project. But because CRE resale 
markets are usually quite thin, price appraisals and 
estimates are typically used instead of market prices. 
CRE property values are therefore marked down 
when rents soften or vacancies rise in that market. 
Borrowers can end up breaching loan covenants 
even if their own project is still profitable in an 
income flow sense; but because the project might 
now be more highly geared, refinancing becomes 
difficult. In a downturn, distressed sales add to the 
difficulties for borrowers that are still performing. 
Along with the more frequent refinancing normally 
built into loan contracts, the sensitivity of CRE loan 
covenants to current valuations results in more 
defaults and distressed sales. These in turn weigh 
on CRE prices elsewhere, generating correlated 
defaults. This contrasts with home borrowers, who 
are generally permitted to stay in a negative equity 
situation for as long as they can service the loan and 
do not want or need to move.
Conclusion
The outlook for commercial property markets and 
lenders in the major countries remains challenging 
as vacancy rates continue to rise and prices and 
rents are yet to recover. It is noteworthy, though, 
that loan losses on commercial property in Australia 
during the recent period have been relatively small 
compared with those in the United States and in 
some countries in Europe. 
The crisis has severely affected global commercial 
property markets, with large declines in asset 
values and a sharp deterioration in asset quality in 
some major markets. In the current cycle as well 
as in previous ones, the downturn in commercial 
property and development markets has generally 
been more severe than in housing markets. The 
effect on bank loan losses is also generally greater. 
A number of factors contribute to this: banks’   
CRE loans are more concentrated in construction 
loans than housing lending is; imbalances can 
build up further because construction lags are 
longer; and borrowers in the CRE sector do not 
have the same disincentives to default as home 
mortgage borrowers. Developments in housing 
markets are also important for financial stability, 
but banks’ related loan losses have historically been 
more concentrated in loans to (corporate) property 
developers, which are captured in CRE lending,   
than in loans to households.  
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